Introduction
As was the norm in the early twentieth century, Maynard Keynes received training in the classics and would have been taught the importance of the "rules of rhetoric" when developing and delivering an argument. The Economic Consequences of the Peace is a particularly good example of the use and effectiveness of Keynes' rhetorical style. In it there are numerous examples of elevated language, a variety of linguistic expressions that gives force to his written style, in addition to the inclusion of statistics as a means by which Keynes could convince his readers of the "factual, objective and neutral" economic arguments he was making. His inclusion of statistics is also often done to provide a balance to his more elaborate prose and back up his claim that Economic Consequences was a serious work of economics.
All communication, whether verbal, written, numerical, or visual, attempts to persuade and can therefore be analysed as rhetoric (Carruthers, B and W. Espeland, July 1991) . Robert Clower (1973, p. 10) argues that 'all communicable knowledge rests in the final analysis upon persuasive rather than demonstrative argument.'
Rhetoric was part of a classics education at the turn of the twentieth century that generally accepted rhetoric as primarily being a "body of rules" 1 that enables a speaker or writer to "express himself with eloquence" and "to persuade or influence others." Furthermore, the written power to persuade is usually to be found in an author's written style. 2 If we accept these views and definitions the applicability to Economic Consequences is quite specific; Keynes was explicit in his attempts at persuasion and quite unashamedly "expressed himself with eloquence," using elevated language and drawing on the legitimacy of numbers so as to assist in carrying his argument. In doing this he integrates statistics and prose in ways that seem convincing to the reader.
The Rhetorical Effectiveness of Keynes' Statistics
To have his statistics accepted by his readers Keynes needed to persuade and convince them of the legitimacy of his economic concerns. The best evidence we have available that he succeeded is that, whereas critics often take Keynes to task for the rhetorical nature of his prose, few mount a similar challenge to his statistics. For example, Keynes uses numerous sets of statistics to support his argument that The Treaty, as proposed at the Conference of Versailles, would place an excessive burden on Germany, destroying not only German industry but put at risk the economies of all European nations. Keynes makes the claim that 'the statistics of economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbours' is overwhelming' (Keynes, 1920, p. 14). According to Keynes economic interdependence came down to three parts of the economy that really mattered: food, coal, and transport.
In the matter of coal he provides a set of statistics that authoritatively claim that the fatal consequences of The Treaty, should its terms be imposed, are economic.
While food and transport are just as important economically for Europe coal was a pivotal economic resource in post-war Europe, as it provided energy for industrial purposes and a source of energy for private consumption. 'The German Empire,'
argued Keynes, 'has been built more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron' (Keynes, 1920, p. 75) . Any adverse impact on supply directly affected economic growth and development potential, in addition to causing individual privation.
Furthermore, when considering the example of coal we can see that Keynes was interested in the rhetorical use of statistics in two ways: first were statements given as facts and then suggested consequences. The facts for Keynes were that: the coal mines in the Saar Basin were to be ceded to France absolutely (refer The Treaty); the Saar district, Keynes points out, had been part of Germany for 1000 years (he assumed this to be common knowledge); Upper Silesia had 23% of the total German output of hard coal (from German statistical sources), yet would be, following a plebiscite, ceded to Poland (refer The Treaty). But, argued Keynes, Upper Silesia had never been part of Poland and 'economically' was 'intensely' German (his source here was from a German representative at The Conference). Out of the coal that would remain to her, Germany was obligated to make good year by year the estimated loss, which France had incurred by the damage and destruction in the coalfields of her Northern Provinces (again, from The Treaty). Sums due for Reparation were to be partly paid in kind rather than cash. To a number of allied countries she was to provide 40,000,000 tons, leaving 60,000,000 tons against a pre-war consumption of 139,000,000 tons (The Treaty). A number of other Treaty provisions would add to this burden, for example, daily shifts were to be reduced from 8.5 to 7 hours (The Treaty).
Having given the reader a set of statements presented as facts, Keynes then paints his picture of consequences. The mining plant, due to the allied blockade, is in bad condition; the physical efficiency of the men impaired by malnutrition 'made worse by a lowered standard of living because of the reparation demands;' the casualties of war had diminished the number of efficient mines. Taken together Keynes argued that only 60,000,000 tons of coal would be left for local consumption, based on the hypothetical calculation of there being only 100,000,000 tons available per annum, of which 40,000,000 were to be mortgaged to the allies. Added to the likelihood that German industry would be destroyed as a result of these terms, the situation in other countries would only add to a burden for all European nations.
France's own output had diminished through the war's destruction. In the UK and
Italy a secondary cause of inadequate coal supplies to enable industry to recover, and provide for the economic needs of the population, was organizational breakdown and inefficiencies of new governments. 'The coal position of all Europe [was] nearly desperate' (Keynes, 1920, pp. 75-85) .
The effectiveness of these calculations is that they move from the seemingly "factual, objective, and neutral" statistics the reader would find difficult to refute (that is to say, if The Treaty says it, this makes it factual) to the consequences Keynes is so anxious to impress on his readers.
Writing twenty five years after the publication of Economic Consequences
Étienne Mantoux, in The Carthaginian Peace (Mantoux, 1946) [and] revolted against the absurd objectives which had been proclaimed, and still more against the execrable methods by which they were achieved. [Keynes] showed in successive chapters of unanswerable good sense the monstrous character of the financial and economic clauses. On all these matters his opinion is good' (Mantoux, 1946, p. 12) .
Statistics and The Economic Consequences of the Peace
Some scholars (Brady, 1988, p. 1.) (Patinkin, 1976 (Patinkin, , p. 1092 ).
Yet Phelps argues that Keynes rejected the extensive use of econometrics largely because he viewed the future as being essentially different from the past and because he believed that the extensive use of mathematics encouraged economists to turn from the important question of choosing which among many economic models is appropriate for a particular situation, to the intellectually taxing, but practically unimportant, manipulation of a single economic model (Phelps, 1980, p. 483 Consequences of recent developments in the growing discipline of statistical economics but the complete absence from his book of any theoretical discussion or use of economic theory indicates that Keynes stood firmly in the tradition of the early pioneers in the use of statistics for descriptive purposes and insofar as he sought reform as a result of his economic arguments, his use of statistics followed the Victorian reformist methods of statistical usage. In the same way that his predecessors used numbers rhetorically, Keynes saw that by using statistics descriptively he was more likely to persuade his readers with numbers than if he were to use them in ways that could confuse them.
Keynes' Use of Statistics in Economic Consequences
I have already argued that a close reading of Economic Consequences supports the view that Keynes placed great weight on the use of statistics from early in his career. (Moggridge, 1992, p. 160) . At the heart of his use of statistics was the two parts that he believed made up the theory of statistics: the descriptive part concerned with presenting, describing and summarizing series of events or instances; and the inductive or inferential part concerned with extending the description of certain characteristics of observed events to those not observed.
A good example of Keynes' use of this theory of statistics is in his discussion on "Germany's capacity to pay." It is also an example of his seemingly unsystematic presentation of the numbers he used. There are three probable explanations for this unsystematic presentation. Firstly the figures appear to be drawn together in a hurried and pragmatic manner where they were initially part of official Treasury memoranda.
The use of memoranda typically involves a style of writing that is 'informal.' The way in which prose and statistics in memoranda attributed to Keynes are grouped by numbered 'bullet points' reflects this informal approach to written communication. (Johnson, 1971, p. 337) . The report of the committee, which was never published, came to the conclusion that Germany should pay the whole cost of the war, estimated at £ 24,000 million (a figure Lloyd
George branded as a wild and fantastic chimera) at the same time as the Treasury's investigations were showing that Germany was capable of paying something between £ 2,000 million and £ 3,000 million. Keynes himself thought that without economic growth to stimulate her exports Germany could pay £ 1,000 million of moveable property at once and £ 1,000 million additional tribute amortised over thirty years.
Detailed workings were provided to the committee in a memorandum headed 'Notes on an Indemnity' and dated 31 October 1918 and, according to Johnson, 'appears to have been Keynes' work alone' (Johnson, 1971, p. 337) . In a letter to his mother on 3
November Keynes remarked that 'an exciting incident of the week was writing a memorandum on indemnities at top speed for an airman to fly to Versailles with' (Johnson, 1971, p. 338 ).
Adding to this sense of urgency (that helps explain Keynes' unsystematic and informal presentation) is that many of his hurriedly prepared numbers are 'cut and pasted' from the original memoranda directly into Economic Consequences. The structure of the 1918 memorandum is followed closely in Economic Consequences.
The memorandum was finalized during November 1918 and most probably presented to the Committee on Indemnity's meeting of 2 December 1918' (Johnson, 1971, p. 336 Keynes responded to Dulles' criticisms in the following way:
(1) [That he had not taken account of the marked rise in prices from 1913 to 1919.] 'This criticism is not well founded. My initial allowance for increased prices, the wide margin I added for contingencies, and the fact that my estimates were in terms of gold and not paper francs, result, so far, for example, as the restoration of houses is concerned, in my upper limit leaving room for an appreciation in the cost of house building, in terms of francs, to nine or ten times the pre-war level. (2) My estimate of what Germany could pay -namely £ 2,000 million at the most. Mr. Dulles does not comment on this estimate. The progress of events since I made it has not led me to modify it upwards. (3) My estimate of what it would be wise on our part to ask from Germanynamely, £ 2,000 million, but with the two important abatements of a rather large allowance for ceded property and the payment of the balance in 30 annual installments without interest. Mr. Dulles thinks my suggested allowance for ceded property too large, on the ground that it would be mainly for war material having little value to the Allies. I intended this figure to cover a great deal besides war material, as, for example, merchant ships, submarine cables, and rolling stock, as well as State property and financial liabilities attributed to ceded territory. … (4) Lastly, there was the German counter proposal of an alleged sum of £ 5,000 million, which to judge from his speech in the House of Commons on February 12 achieved at least as much of its object to deceive Mr. Balfour. But of course the real value of Count Rantzau's offer was nothing of the kind, as I have explained in detail in pp. 204-209 of my book, and, indeed, as the Allies themselves have pointed out in the official reply which they addressed to him. ….. Mr. Dulles … does not dispute my estimate of the real money value of the offer as being somewhere about £ 1,500 million. But he forgets that even this figure is not comparable with those cited above, since the German offer was conditional on the abandonment of most of the rest of the treaty, including all the territorial clauses and those relating to the mercantile marine and to German property abroad (Johnson, 1977, pp. 26-28) .
Two aspects about this exchange are striking. In the first place Keynes goes into detail as to how he arrived at his figures (refer point 1) and helps explain why there has been considerable debate around the statistics he uses. In short, statistics can never be taken on face value alone, they are invariably underpinned by a methodology and detail that, if we don't have access to this information, makes it very difficult to analyse and helps cast doubt on the figures used. If Keynes was working to a methodology for establishing many of his statistics it is not obvious from the archival material that has survived. But in this letter to Dulles he talks of using a contingency factor, allowing for price changes, and his use of the valuation of gold rather than the exchange rate for francs suggests that Keynes had some way of calculating his numbers. However, if he did there seems little consistency to the way in which he applies such a methodology, which means we are left with a high degree of speculation when trying to "get behind" Keynes' numbers. What Keynes did reasonably well was to provide the reader with references to many of his sources. But this just adds to what we do know, which is that Keynes was interested in statistics as a means of description and authoritative support for his arguments.
The second aspect that is important about the exchange between Dulles and
Keynes is that it is representative of where most of any challenge to Keynes national income and late 1920s average exports, the allies demands for reparations from Germany were large relative to German demands on France in 1871 or to other historically large financial transfers. Furthermore, the German payments were to continue for a much longer period than those of 1871. This ruled out the possibility of substantial recycling as had occurred in 1871 because when there is a stream of payments for several decades ahead, 'borrowing to service or anticipate a substantial portion of these payments is hardly feasible' (Moggridge, 1992, p. 343) . Some borrowing might transfer some payments from earlier to later years when incomes and trade would be greater, but for payments the size of those demanded in 1919 a large proportion would have to come from current international earnings.
While there was considerable debate at the time around reparation claims, the issue that dominated debate was Germany's "capacity to pay" reparations and the economic consequences of such payments. One complication in the debate was that the reparation sum was set in nominal terms in foreign currency. A worldwide rise in prices would reduce the real resource costs of any transfer of reparations, a fall would increase it. During the nineteenth century the trend of prices had been flat, but fluctuations around the trend were significant and lengthy. Keynes, having grown up in such a stable era would, argues Moggridge, have been more worried about the risk of a significant fall in prices as this would have the effect of paying large nominal sums over a long period more worrying than in the present day when we live, comparatively speaking, in an inflationary world.
When it came to determining Germany's capacity to pay, most economists were interested in Germany's ability to expand her exports and/or decrease her imports of goods and services to effect the transfer. The relevant issues in this debate are the time allowed for the changes in question, the magnitude of the changes, and the structure of the relevant markets. On the question of time, Keynes conceded that if the allies nursed the Germany economy back to health over a period of five to ten years they could obtain larger streams of payments than otherwise. There was little disagreement over this view. But there was room for disagreement as to the prospect of such time being allowed and the extent of the 'nursing' involved. Keynes, looking at the Treaty and the financial policies of the allies, was pessimistic on both counts.
On the question of magnitude the question had to be asked, could Germany transform her international accounts so as to produce an export surplus of the relevant size even if the allies allowed? Was it possible by appropriate policy measures to reduce domestic consumption and raise Germany's net international receipts?
Moggridge argues that to a modern economist the answer would be 'yes in theory.' A mixture of tax, monetary and exchange-rate policies would reduce domestic consumption and raise the output of goods moving into international trade relative to those which did not. But in 1919 this was not a theoretical question. Keynes was arguing that there was nothing to give on the consumption side and that, especially after the other allied depredations of the Treaty, the resources were not available and that they were not likely to be available in the foreseeable future. His opponents took a different view, often arguing that Keynes underestimated the recuperative power of the German economy and at the same time that the Treaty would in any case be modified to ease the burdens. 'Certainly, looking at the magnitudes involved, the figures above, though high, are not impossible for a more normal period. Whether the results would meet the needs or desires of the allies was another matter' (Moggridge, 1992, p. 344) . However, any serious attempt by Germany to pay reparations (which there never was) as laid down in the Treaty would have required a substantial net increase in her exports of coal and manufactured goods. Such an expansion would have inevitably been at the expense of other producers.
But, the question whether Germany had the capacity to pay reparations on the scale demanded by the Treaty was never put to the test. In the late 1920s, German reparation payments averaged just over 1.5 billion marks -less than 2 per cent of national income or just over 13 per cent of her exports. 11 The proportions rose with the 1929 slump, but it was only in those years that Germany's export surplus was actually needed to cover her reparations bill, for prior to 1929 German capital imports had more than offset her reparations payments. The system collapsed shortly after.
The general consensus among scholars is that she could have paid more than she did if there had been a willingness to pay in Germany, a willingness on the part of the allies to receive and a willingness to tackle associated problems. 'But whether she could have managed the figures of 1919 remains an open question' (Moggridge, 1992, p. 345) .
In summary, the most significant aspect of the contemporary reaction to
Keynes' use of statistics in Economic Consequences is that the reaction was relatively muted compared to the reaction he received on the political nature of the book.
However, this muted reaction demonstrates how rhetorically effective Keynes use of statistics was. While often fierce debate centred on many of the reparation numbers, Keynes drew little reaction or dispute to his figures, calculations and conclusions.
This reinforces the view that Keynes was widely acknowledged as an 'expert' on the subject of indemnities with few alternatives to legitimately stand in disagreement to his own.
Étienne Mantoux: The Carthaginian Peace or The Economic Consequences of Mr. Keynes
The first serious and analytical challenge to the statistics used by Keynes He estimated Germany's national savings for future years at less than 2 billion marks.
In 1925 the figure was estimated at 6.4 billion and in 1927 at 7.6 billion. Keynes predicted that Germany could not afford to pay more than 2 billion marks a year in reparations for the next 30 years, yet between 1933 and 1939 Germany spent seven times as much a year on re-armament alone. London Schedule of Payments and that this figure was not excessive. But, once again, a judgment only possible in hindsight (Singleton, 2007, p. 33 ).
Ferguson also argues that Keynes' arguments and figures were exaggerated and makes four statistical comparisons between Britain and Germany immediately following the war so as to make his point, although it is not clear why Ferguson chooses these particular figures as they really say nothing about his central claim of exaggeration. In the first example, he contends that some 2.4 million British workers were involved in strikes in 1919, 300,000 more than in revolutionary Germany.
Second, in 1921 86 million days were lost in industrial disputes; the German figure was 22.6 million. Ferguson's third example is that the electorate was increased from 7.7 million to 21.4 million by the 1918 Representation of the People Act, more or less giving Britain the franchise Germans had enjoyed since 1871 (universal male suffrage). In the final example, only in the inflationary stakes did Germany fare worse, having run completely out of control, so that the Reichsmark was worth virtually nothing by the end of 1923 (Ferguson, 1999, p. 396) . In reality, argues
Ferguson, the peace terms were not unprecedented in their harshness and the German hyperinflation was mainly due to the irresponsible fiscal and monetary policies adopted by the Germans themselves. (Hawtrey, 1946, p. 236 ).
Hawtrey also argues that with the inflation of 1921-3 this meant that such payments as Germany made were at the cost of depleting the working capital of Germany had in effect 'engaged herself to hand over to the Allies the whole of her surplus production in perpetuity.' (Keynes, 1920, p. 154) . The charge of some £ 400 million a year for thirty years, according to Hawtrey, would have deprived German economic life of the essential resources of development, or indeed of maintenance, since capital outlay on technological improvements 'is an indispensable condition of competitive power' (Hawtrey, 1946, p. 236) . This is Hawtrey's rebuff of Mantoux's argument that 'it would not have been economically impossible to exact payments in excess of what was necessary to maintain Germany's national capital intact' (Hawtrey, 1946, p. 236 Hawtrey is also interested in setting to rights Mantoux's main argument, namely that the Allies were in a position to make Germany hand over something more than the whole of her surplus, but that, owing to the influence of Keynes' book, they failed to do so. Germany did retain enough of her surplus to achieve a rapid and almost complete recovery, and thereafter used her renewed economic power to re-arm on a scale almost sufficient for her to subjugate the world. (Hawtrey, 1946, pp. 237-238) .
Conclusion
Most present day scholars argue that Keynes exaggerated Germany's inability to meet the reparation terms laid down in The Treaty. Typically they point to the way Keynes November 1918 amounted to £ 115,417,900. This was a very much larger amount than had appeared in the Reichsbank's return prior to the war, and was the result of the vigorous campaign which has been continuously conducted {carried on} in Germany {during the war} for the surrender to the Reichsbank not only of gold coin but of gold ornaments of every kind. Private hoards doubtless still exist, but, in view of the great efforts already made, it is unlikely that either the German Government or the Allies will be able to unearth them. It is not known whether the Reichsbank or the government possess a secret hoard but, as every effort has been made throughout the war to counteract the effect of a largely increased note issue by showing as much gold as possible in the Reichsbank's return, it is extremely unlikely that any substantial amount is held by the government outside this return. The return {can} should therefore be taken as probably representing the maximum amount which the German Government {are} have been able to extract from their people. In addition to gold there {was} is {in the Reichsbank} a sum of about £ 1,000,000 in silver in the Reichsbank. There {must be} is, however, a further substantial amount in circulation, {for} the holdings of the Reichsbank having been {were} as high as £ 9,100,000 on the 31 st December 1917, and having stood at about £ 6,000,000 up to the latter part of October 1918, when the internal run began on currency of every kind. We may, therefore, take a total of (say) £ 125,000,000 for gold and silver together {at the date of the Armistice}.' 
